1. Planning Failures
Unclear
Roles & Responsibilities: USSS personnel responsible for planning and
securing the rally did not clearly define individual responsibilities. Key
planning decisions were made jointly, without a single person accountable for
the overall security measures.
Lack
of AGR Building Security: The AGR building, identified as a key threat due to
its line-of-sight to the stage, was inadequately covered. Despite concerns,
neither the USSS nor local law enforcement took sufficient action to secure
this location. The USSS believed local snipers would cover it, but the AGR roof
was not appropriately monitored or locked down.
Perimeter
Confusion: There was a lack of clarity about who was responsible for defining
and securing the perimeter. The USSS advance agents, responsible for security
measures, did not sweep the AGR building nor adequately plan for its security
coverage.
Key
Analysis: The failure to secure the AGR building was one of the most glaring
planning failures. It provided an accessible vantage point for the attacker,
Crooks, who climbed onto the roof undetected. The lack of a clear chain of
command within the USSS advance team exacerbated these vulnerabilities.
2.
Coordination Failures
Siloed
Communications: The USSS did not effectively communicate with local law
enforcement. There were separate communications centers—one for USSS and
another for local law enforcement—and they operated on different radio
channels, further fragmenting real-time information sharing.
Failure
to Relay Critical Information: USSS personnel were informed 27 minutes before
the shooting that a suspicious individual with a rangefinder was near the AGR
building, yet this was not relayed to key officials or acted upon. Similarly,
information about an armed person on the AGR roof was received two minutes
before the shooting but failed to prompt immediate protective measures for
Trump.
Disorganization
in Planning Meetings: USSS advance agents did not request state or local
operational plans and often did not attend site visits or briefings in person.
This contributed to the lack of coherent coordination between federal, state,
and local agencies.
Key
Analysis: These coordination failures were critical. Had there been more
real-time communication and proper collaboration between USSS and local law
enforcement, the suspicious activity around the AGR building might have been
addressed in time to prevent the attack.
3.
Communication and Technical Failures
Radio
and Equipment Issues: Several USSS agents experienced technical difficulties
with their radios during the event, which hindered their ability to communicate
with other teams. These problems are noted to be common in USSS operations. In
one instance, a key agent did not have a functioning radio throughout the
rally.
C-UAS
(Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System) Failure: The USSS counter-drone system was
inoperable for several hours and was only fixed shortly before Crooks flew a
drone near the rally site. The agent in charge had little experience with the
system and had to call tech support to resolve the issue.
Key
Analysis: Technical failures, especially the counter-drone system, compromised
the event’s security. In today’s environment, where drones can pose significant
threats, an inoperable C-UAS system left the site more vulnerable.
4.
Resource Denial & Insufficient Security Measures
Denied
Resource Requests: USSS requests for additional security assets, such as a
Counter Assault Team liaison and more advanced C-UAS capabilities, were denied
without clear explanations. This left the team under-resourced and unable to
respond to potential threats, including aerial drones adequately.
Insufficient
Counter Snipers: Though USSS deployed a counter-sniper team, their positioning
and line-of-sight coverage were insufficient. For instance, the trees partially
obstructed one sniper team's view of the AGR building roof, from where Crooks
ultimately fired. These snipers were not given clear instructions about this
obstruction.
Key Analysis: The denial of critical
resources (e.g., additional C-UAS assets) and a lack of robust measures, such
as properly positioned counter-snipers, further weakened the protective
security setup. These deficiencies left Trump exposed at the rally.
5.
Failures in Response to Known Threats
Ignoring
“Credible Intelligence”: USSS assigned a counter-sniper team to the rally based
on credible intelligence of a threat, which was unusual for a former
president’s event. However, the FBI later stated that Crooks was not known to
them before the assassination attempt, indicating potential lapses in
intelligence coordination.
Missed
Signals: The USSS failed to act decisively even after receiving reports of
suspicious behaviour and an individual on the AGR roof. A counter-sniper
observed local officers running towards the AGR building with guns drawn but
did not notify Trump’s detail to remove him from the stage, a decision he later
admitted was an oversight.
Key
Analysis: Despite being aware of potential threats, the USSS failed to prepare
for or respond to these risks adequately. The intelligence-sharing failures
between federal agencies, including the FBI, and the missed opportunities to
protect Trump are particularly concerning.
Conclusion:
Critical Protective Event Failures
The USSS failed at multiple levels, from
planning and coordination to communication and response. The failure to define
clear responsibilities, the lack of effective communication between agencies,
and resource denials critically undermined the event's security. The AGR
building, a known vulnerability, was left unprotected, which allowed Crooks to
carry out his attack. This report exposes significant weaknesses in the USSS's
ability to protect high-profile individuals in complex environments, necessitating
major reforms in planning, coordination, and resourcing for future events.
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