Eliminate or Radically Downsize the Department of Canadian Heritage

 A 30-Year Experiment That Has Largely Failed

Pragmatic Canadian – Revised January 2025

In December 2023, Argentina’s new president cut the number of federal ministries from 18 to 9 and eliminated tens of thousands of public-service positions in a matter of weeks. The exercise forced a simple question: which parts of our own federal government actually deliver more value than they cost—and which do the opposite?

Canada now has 42 federal departments and separate ministries (not counting agencies and Crown corporations). Few Canadians can name more than a dozen. One that rarely makes the list, yet wields outsized influence, is the Department of Canadian Heritage (PCH). Created only in 1993, it has grown into a $1.7 billion-per-year department (2024–25 Main Estimates, excluding CBC) with 1,850 employees and oversight of 11 Crown corporations.

Most Canadians assume a “Heritage” department preserves museums, promotes the arts, and protects national symbols. In reality, its current footprint is far broader—and far more controversial.

Three high-profile failures in 18 months

1. Bill C-18 (Online News Act) – 2023 Intended to force Google and Meta to pay Canadian media for links. Meta responded by blocking all news for 35 million Canadian users. Google eventually agreed to pay ≈$100 million annually into a fund. Net result according to most independent analyses: less news circulation, no new sustainable revenue model for most outlets, and a precedent for state-managed news compensation.
2. Bill C-11 (Online Streaming Act) – 2022–2024 Extended 20th-century Canadian-content rules to YouTube, TikTok, Spotify, Netflix, etc. The CRTC is still writing thousands of pages of regulations that will determine discoverability, mandatory financial contributions, and (in some cases) what individual user-generated content is promoted or demoted. Critics across the political spectrum—from the Macdonald-Laurier Institute to the Michael Geist law clinic—warn of inevitable free-expression chill and bureaucratic overreach.
3. Ongoing CBC “modernization” mandate, PCH is the sponsoring department for a Crown corporation that receives ≈$1.4 billion annually, while its English television audience has fallen below 2 % nationally in most prime-time slots. The department’s 2024–25 plan lists “support the transformation of CBC/Radio-Canada” as a core objective—meaning the same ministry that regulates private broadcasters is now in charge of restructuring its largest publicly funded competitor.

A mandate that overlaps everywhere

The department’s own 2023–24 Departmental Plan lists five “core responsibilities”:

1. Creativity, arts and culture
2. Heritage and celebration
3. Sport
4. Diversity and inclusion
5. Official languages

At least 60 % of these already belong to other full departments or ministries:

• Sport → Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs + separate Minister of Sport
• Diversity & Inclusion → separate Minister of Diversity, Inclusion and Persons with Disabilities
• Official languages → Treasury Board + Justice + separate coordination secretariat
• Indigenous cultural heritage → Indigenous Services + Crown-Indigenous Relations
• Gender equality and 2SLGBTQI+ issues → Women and Gender Equality Canada (WAGE)

In other words, Canadian Heritage duplicates work that six other organizations are already paid to do.

The commemorative-days test

Perhaps the clearest window into the department’s current priorities is its official list of “National Days, Weeks, Months and Observances.” As of 2024, the list contains 62 separate recognitions.

• 12 focus on gender, sexual orientation or women (with dedicated months/weeks for International Women’s Day, Pride, Trans Day of Visibility, etc.)
• 30 celebrate specific ethnic, racial or Indigenous identities or histories
• 8 are framed around overcoming historic or ongoing oppression
• 19 lasts an entire week or month (Pride is a full season in some regions)

By contrast, only five single days are dedicated to the country as a whole: Canada Day, National Flag Day, Victoria Day, Remembrance Day, and Sir John A. Macdonald Day.

Whatever one thinks of each individual observance, a department whose statutory mission is to “foster Canadian identity and values” now formally recognizes a new identity-based commemoration roughly once every six days while giving only five days to shared national moments. That ratio speaks for itself.

A modest proposal

Canada functioned perfectly well for its first 126 years without a standalone Department of Canadian Heritage. Its legitimate functions (museums, national parks, historic sites, archives, grants to arms-length arts organizations) were handled by smaller, more focused entities.

There is no compelling reason that those functions require:

• a regulator of internet speech (C-11)
• a negotiator of link taxes with global tech platforms (C-18)
• a $1.4 billion annual subsidy to one broadcaster plus oversight of its “transformation.”
• a sixth bureaucracy doing diversity, sport, and official languages work already done elsewhere

A future government could, with a single piece of legislation, dissolve the department and redistribute the few genuinely necessary pieces:

• Museums, Library and Archives Canada, and historic sites → a strengthened Parks Canada or a new arm’s-length National Heritage Agency
• Core arts-granting councils (Canada Council, Telefilm) → independent again, as they were before 1993
• Broadcasting policy and internet regulation → either eliminated entirely or moved to a slimmed-down Industry Canada
• CBC funding and oversight → direct reporting to Parliament or sunset over a fixed transition period

Argentina showed that large-scale government downsizing is politically possible when the case is clear. The Department of Canadian Heritage is one place where the case is overwhelming: three decades of mission creep, repeated policy debacles, and a track record of amplifying division rather than shared identity.

It is time to admit the 1993 experiment has run its course.

Comparing the EU's Failed Constitutional Treaty to Quebec's Bill 1: Two Cases of Top-Down Constitutional Overreach

Comparing the EU's Failed Constitutional Treaty to Quebec's Bill 1: Two Cases of Top-Down Constitutional Overreach

Both the European Union's aborted Constitutional Treaty of 2004 and Quebec's Bill 1 (the Québec Constitution Act, 2025, tabled in October 2025) represent ambitious attempts to constitutionalize supranational or national aspirations through elite-driven processes that sidelined broad public buy-in. 

In each case, the resulting documents—or near-documents—failed (or risk failing) to fulfill the core functions of a true constitution: forging societal cohesion, safeguarding rights, constraining governmental excess, and mirroring the polity's diversity. Instead, they highlight a "democratic step backward," as one might aptly put it for Bill 1, where rushed legislative maneuvers prioritize political symbolism over deliberative legitimacy. Below is a breakdown of the parallels and contrasts across key dimensions, drawing on the historical record for the EU and recent developments for Quebec.

1. Adoption Process: Rushed Elitism vs. Deliberative Ideal

• EU Constitutional Treaty: Drafted by a 105-member Convention on the Future of Europe (2001–2002), which included parliamentarians, national officials, and civil society reps, it aimed for inclusivity. Yet, the final text was hammered out in secretive intergovernmental conferences, then ratified via national parliaments or referendums. The "rushed" element came in the post-draft phase: governments pushed for quick adoption to meet EU enlargement deadlines in 2004, framing it as "housekeeping" to streamline the bloated treaty system. This backfired spectacularly—French and Dutch voters rejected it in 2005 referendums (54.7% and 61.6% "No," respectively), exposing the disconnect between Brussels elites and citizens wary of a federalizing super-state.
• Quebec's Bill 1: Tabled by the CAQ government under Premier François Legault as the first bill of the 43rd Legislature's second session, it's being advanced through standard legislative channels without prior public consultations, Indigenous engagement, or multi-party input—despite its sweeping scope. Critics, including opposition parties (e.g., Parti Québécois, Liberals) and civil liberties groups, decry it as a unilateral power grab at the tail end of the CAQ's mandate, timed for electoral appeal ahead of 2026 polls. Hearings are slated for late November 2025, with a clause-by-clause study in spring 2026, but the lack of a constitutional convention or referendum makes it feel like "routine housekeeping" for nationalist posturing, not a foundational pact.
• Parallel: Both bypassed the "broad participation and careful deliberation."  The EU's convention was more participatory on paper, but ratification exposed its top-down flaws; Bill 1 skips even that pretense, risking division rather than unity in a province already polarized on identity issues.

2. Societal Binding: Symbolism Without Shared Demos

• EU: Intended to cultivate a "European demos" via symbols (flag, anthem, "EU Constitution" title) and institutions (e.g., elected Parliament strengthening), it couldn't overcome national allegiances. Low EP election turnout (43% in 2004) and the referendums' backlash underscored a failure to bind diverse societies—East vs. West, rich vs. poor—into a cohesive whole.
• Bill 1: Enshrines Quebec as a "free national State" with "precedence over any inconsistent rule of law" (including federal ones), codifying CAQ priorities like secularism (Bill 21) and language protection (Bill 96). It aims to "affirm the constitutional existence of the Quebec nation," but without dialogue, it alienates anglophones, allophones, Indigenous nations, and federalists, potentially fracturing social cohesion in a multicultural province.
• Parallel: Neither fosters genuine buy-in; the EU's grand vision crumbled under diversity's weight, while Bill 1's nationalist framing risks entrenching "us vs. them" divides, as noted by legal experts like Julius Grey.

3. Rights Protection: Prioritizing Collective Over Individual

• EU: Incorporated the Charter of Fundamental Rights but was criticized for diluting national protections (e.g., via supremacy of EU law). Post-rejection Lisbon Treaty (2009) made the Charter binding, yet perceptions persist of EU courts overriding domestic rights (e.g., German challenges to ECB policies).
• Bill 1: Amends the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms to "balance" collective "nation's rights" (language, culture) against individuals, while shielding the notwithstanding clause from justification requirements and barring public funds for challenges to "nation-protecting" laws. This could hobble rights enforcement, especially for minorities, by weakening judicial recourse and reorienting the Human Rights Commission toward "nation's rights."
• Parallel: Both tilt toward collective goals at rights' expense—the EU's integrationist push vs. Quebec's nation-building—eroding trust in supranational/provincial safeguards.

4. Limiting Government Power: Empowering Elites, Not Checks

• EU: Aimed to curb the "democratic deficit" with a stronger Parliament and transparent Council, but entrenched the unelected Commission's legislative monopoly and opaque bargaining, expanding EU powers without proportional accountability.
• Bill 1: Creates a Conseil constitutionnel (Quebec Constitutional Council) for oversight, but asserts parliamentary sovereignty to pass laws immune from federal or judicial vetoes. It eliminates the lieutenant-governor's role (a federal check), claims precedence over the Constitution Act, 1867, and centralizes power in the National Assembly—potentially sparking a constitutional crisis with Ottawa.
• Parallel: Far from limiting power, both entrench elite control: the EU's technocratic sprawl and Bill 1's insulation of CAQ policies from scrutiny, as warned by civil rights groups.

5. Reflecting Diversity: Uniformity Imposed on Pluralism

• EU: Pushed a "one-size-fits-all" model (e.g., eurozone rules) that clashed with Eastern Europe's post-communist realities and Southern debt crises, fueling Euroscepticism.
• Bill 1: Defines Quebec through "founding principles" like French primacy and secularism, but ignores Indigenous perspectives and multicultural fabrics—framed as a "monolithic" vision that could marginalize non-francophone communities.
• Parallel: Both impose a homogenized identity (pan-European or Quebecois nationalism) on diverse populations, breeding resentment rather than representation.

Dimension	EU Constitutional Treaty (2004)	Quebec Bill 1 (2025)
Process	Convention + secretive IGC; referendums derailed it	Unilateral tabling; no prior consultations
Societal Bind	Failed to create "European people"	Risks alienating minorities in "nation" narrative
Rights Protection	Charter binding but supremacy erodes national trust	Weakens individual rights for collective "nation"
Power Limits	Expanded EU without full accountability	Shields legislature from federal/judicial checks
Diversity Reflection	Uniform rules ignored regional variances	Monocultural frame overlooks Indigenous/multicultural input

In essence, the EU's treaty was a cautionary tale of overambition without grassroots legitimacy, leading to its stealth repurposing in Lisbon—a "constitution in disguise" that still grapples with deficits. Bill 1 echoes this as a provocative "law of laws" that, if passed, could provoke federal clashes and erosion of rights without the deliberation needed for endurance. True constitutions, as noted, demand participation to endure; these experiments underscore why shortcuts breed backlash. 

If Bill 1 advances without reform, it may fare no better than its European predecessor—another step back from democratic maturity.

Canada Is Quietly Testing the Limits of Its Constitution — And the Warning Signs Are Already Here

 

Democratic Restraint and Constitutional Culture: Revisiting Insite, Vavilov, and Canada’s Unwritten Governance Framework

Canada’s constitutional order relies not only on formal legal texts but also on interpretive principles, administrative accountability, and unwritten conventions that guide the exercise of state power. Recent political developments—including increased executive discretion, accelerated policymaking, and the framing of governance through urgency rather than evidence—raise questions about whether these constitutional safeguards are being strained.

This article examines three pillars of Canada’s constitutional architecture: (1) evidence-based constraints on state power as articulated in the Insite ruling; (2) the justificatory framework for administrative decision-making reaffirmed in Vavilov; and (3) the normative force of constitutional conventions as articulated in the Patriation Reference and subsequent scholarship. Taken together, these elements illustrate the need for renewed attention to constitutional culture, democratic restraint, and the normative expectations that underlie responsible governance in Canada.

Introduction

Democratic decline rarely begins with a dramatic rupture; instead, it starts with small deviations from institutional norms, often justified as temporary, necessary, or efficient. Canada’s legal tradition has long emphasized that constitutionalism is both legal and cultural: it depends on courts to articulate limits, but also on governments to internalize restraint.

Canada is now facing a moment where expediency increasingly competes with constitutional process. The framing of public policy as inherently urgent—whether regarding public health, security, or digital regulation—has accelerated policymaking in ways that sometimes sidestep deliberation, parliamentary scrutiny, and public justification.

Against this backdrop, three areas of constitutional law serve as guideposts:

• the requirement for evidence-based state action;

• the obligation of reasoned decision-making by administrative bodies;

• and the ongoing relevance of unwritten constitutional principles.

Insite and the Evidentiary Burden on State Power

The Supreme Court’s decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society (Insite) reaffirmed that constitutional rights are not subject to shifting political preferences. The ruling held that when state action jeopardizes life or security of the person under section 7 of the Charter, the state must justify such action through demonstrable evidence—not theoretical risk or ideological position.

The policy relevance of the judgment is not limited to the supervised injection site context. Instead, Insite affirms a broader constitutional rule:

Government may regulate, restrict, or intervene—but only where such action is demonstrably rational, proportionate, and evidence-based.

In an era marked by expanding regulatory frameworks—ranging from public health directives to digital governance—the reasoning in Insite provides a constitutional benchmark resisting the normalization of speculative or paternalistic policymaking.

Vavilov and the Duty to Justify Administrative Power

The 2019 Vavilov decision represents a constitutional recalibration of administrative law. Rather than treating administrative discretion as self-legitimizing, the Court repositioned justification as the core condition of lawful authority.

Administrative decisions must now meet a standard of intelligibility, transparency, and rationality. The decision’s broader democratic meaning is clear:

In a constitutional state, the exercise of public power must be explained—not assumed.

As regulatory systems evolve and governments increasingly rely on delegated authority rather than legislative enactment, Vavilov serves as a safeguard, ensuring that administrative governance remains accountable to constitutional norms rather than convenience.

Constitutional Conventions and the Culture of Restraint

Unlike jurisdictions with a comprehensive written constitution, Canada distributes constitutional authority across legislation, jurisprudence, and unwritten conventions. As articulated in the Patriation Reference, conventions are binding upon political actors even where they lack formal legal enforceability. They are the behavioural norms that prevent lawful action from becoming illegitimate action.

Examples include:

• ministerial responsibility;

• parliamentary supremacy in scrutiny of spending and emergency powers;

• judicial independence;

• respect for opposition and the press as democratic checks.

These conventions form what some scholars call Canada’s constitutional morality—a shared understanding that power must be exercised with restraint, transparency, and accountability.

However, conventions are uniquely vulnerable: they erode through neglect rather than confrontation. Once abandoned, restoration is difficult.

The Present Moment: A Slow Drift or a Constitutional Inflection Point?

Indicators of strain now exist across Canada’s constitutional landscape:

• Emergency-style governance invoked outside traditional emergency thresholds

• Policy justified primarily through appeals to necessity rather than evidence

• Expansion of administrative discretion without proportional increases in transparency

• The tendency to frame dissent—not as participation—but as obstruction

These developments do not yet constitute a constitutional crisis. But they do suggest constitutional drift—subtle, incremental, and largely administrative.

Conclusion

A constitutional democracy is not preserved by law alone. It endures through the ongoing public expectation that power must be justified, rights must be respected, and governance must remain accountable to evidence, process, and restraint.

Insite demands evidence.
Vavilov demands reasoning.
Constitutional conventions demand self-restraint.

Together, they form a tripartite framework for maintaining the legitimacy of public authority in Canada.

As Canada continues to navigate increasingly complex governance challenges, adherence to these principles will determine whether our constitutional culture strengthens—or whether it slowly erodes under the weight of expediency.

SOURCES:

Selected Legal Citations 

1. Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134.

2. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65.

3. Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Patriation Reference), [1981] 1 SCR 753.

4. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf (Toronto: Thomson Reuters).

5. Dwight Newman, “Constitutional Conventions and Democratic Legitimacy” (2013) UTLJ.

Rail Reality Check: Kingston Commuters Have Options — and Perspective Is Needed

The Kingston This Week piece sensationalizes a relatively narrow service adjustment (the VIA Rail Train 50 pilot reallocation) without presenting the full transportation reality — namely, the abundance of alternatives already linking Kingston and Ottawa daily: multiple intercity bus lines (Megabus, FlixBus, Rider Express, Red Arrow, etc.), Ontario Northland’s network, car-sharing services like Poparide and KABU, and, of course, direct highway access via Highway 15 or 401/416.

While politicians and a handful of commuters express outrage over VIA Rail’s temporary Train 50 service adjustment, it’s time for some factual grounding and perspective. The narrative that Kingston has suddenly been left stranded between Toronto and Ottawa simply doesn’t hold water.

1️⃣ The Myth of “No Alternatives”

Contrary to claims repeated in local media, Kingston residents have multiple affordable, accessible, and frequent alternatives to reach Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal, and beyond.

• Intercity buses: FlixBus, Megabus, Rider Express, Red Arrow, and Ontario Northland all operate daily Kingston–Ottawa routes.

• Car share options: Poparide, KABU, and other ride-share platforms post numerous same-day trips every morning.

• Highway access: The 401 and 416 corridors remain among the safest and fastest in the province.
  In short, the infrastructure and private services already exist — and they are widely used.

2️⃣ The Numbers That Matter

Before crying foul, let’s ask: how many daily commuters were actually dependent on Train 50?
VIA’s own data shows that the majority of Kingston–Ottawa traffic occurs via Trains 42 and 43, with Train 50 representing a fraction of total passengers. Yet media coverage treats the change as a citywide crisis.
Without publicly disclosed ridership figures, public outrage lacks factual grounding. Responsible journalism — and responsible politics — demand data before drama.

3️⃣ Smart Transit Means Testing, Not Clinging

VIA Rail’s three-month pilot is part of a broader modernization effort to evaluate more direct Toronto–Montreal service frequency. It’s an experiment — not abandonment. Progress sometimes means testing efficiency and redistributing resources temporarily.
Kingston remains a major VIA stop with multiple departures daily. The city is not losing service; it’s adapting to a pilot that will yield long-term gains in scheduling and connectivity.

4️⃣ Civic Leaders Should Lead, Not Stoke Emotion

Rather than amplifying public anxiety, political figures should engage VIA Rail constructively to ensure the pilot’s data collection is transparent and that commuter needs are fairly assessed after the trial. Leadership is about facilitating solutions — not fueling outrage for headlines.

5️⃣ The Bigger Picture: Choice and Competition

Canada’s future in transportation lies not in rigid dependence on one state-run carrier, but in embracing multimodal, competitive systems that give travellers options — trains, buses, shared rides, and electric vehicles alike. Kingston, strategically located, already benefits from this diversity.

Bottom Line

Commuter inconvenience is regrettable — but temporary. Exaggerating it into a civic crisis helps no one.
If the goal is better service and mobility for all, then Kingston should welcome this pilot as part of the national evolution toward modern, efficient, and sustainable intercity travel.

UPDATE: 

Here is Mr. Hall's email (1) to me, along with my rebuttal to his email (2), so everyone can make up their own minds: 

(1). Re: Rail Reality Check: Kingston Commuters Have Options — and Perspective Is Needed

Inbox

Hall, Bill	12:12 PM (1 hour ago)
to me, Jan

Dear Mr. Clarke,

Not once in my article regarding the changes in VIA Rail's services did I state it was "abandonment" or a "civic crisis" as you claim in your e-mail.

Nowhere in my article did I say there were no alternatives to Train 50 or any other train. 

I simply let a disappointed passenger explain how it was a terrible inconvenience, how it might impact his livelihood and that the other alternatives were not preferred.

I also gave, as an impartial journalist, an opportunity for all levels of government to speak on the matter.

If anything could "stoke emotion," as you put it, it would be your inflammatory remarks here, had they found a greater platform.

People have a right to complain when their quality of life declines, and The Kingston Whig-Standard ensures they have a voice.

Sincerely,

Bill Hall

bihall@postmedia.com

(2).

Peter R. Clarke <clarketoronto@gmail.com>	1:18 PM (19 minutes ago)
to Bill

Dear Mr. Hall,

Thank you for your reply.

You are correct that your article never used the literal words “abandonment” or “civic crisis.”
However, what I addressed — and still stand by — is the impression your reporting conveyed. Tone, framing, and omission often speak louder than words.

Your article presented a one-sided narrative by amplifying commuter frustration while offering no quantitative data or broader context. The casual reader is left to assume a major service collapse — when, in reality, Kingston remains well-served by multiple alternatives: frequent intercity buses (FlixBus, Megabus, Rider Express, Red Arrow, Ontario Northland), car shares, and other VIA departures. Those are undisputed facts.

You also cite a single passenger’s personal inconvenience as the article’s emotional anchor. Journalism is strongest when personal stories are balanced with empirical evidence. For instance, where are the ridership numbers for Train 50, the number of affected passengers, or VIA Rail’s stated trial objectives?

Yes — people have every right to express dissatisfaction. But citizens also have a right to accurate scale and perspective. The role of journalism, especially in smaller cities, is to inform, not inflame.

My piece did not attack you personally; it challenged the framing of the issue — a fair and necessary part of civic discourse. If such discussion is deemed “inflammatory,” then public debate itself is at risk.

Respectfully,
Peter Clarke

SOURCE: 

https://www.thewhig.com/news/a-rail-less-travelled-passengers-frustrated-as-via-cancels-morning-stops-in-kingston