U.S. Secret Service Security Failures During The July 13, 2024, Trump Assassination Attempt:

 1. Planning Failures

 

Unclear Roles & Responsibilities: USSS personnel responsible for planning and securing the rally did not clearly define individual responsibilities. Key planning decisions were made jointly, without a single person accountable for the overall security measures.

 

Lack of AGR Building Security: The AGR building, identified as a key threat due to its line-of-sight to the stage, was inadequately covered. Despite concerns, neither the USSS nor local law enforcement took sufficient action to secure this location. The USSS believed local snipers would cover it, but the AGR roof was not appropriately monitored or locked down.

 

Perimeter Confusion: There was a lack of clarity about who was responsible for defining and securing the perimeter. The USSS advance agents, responsible for security measures, did not sweep the AGR building nor adequately plan for its security coverage.

 

Key Analysis: The failure to secure the AGR building was one of the most glaring planning failures. It provided an accessible vantage point for the attacker, Crooks, who climbed onto the roof undetected. The lack of a clear chain of command within the USSS advance team exacerbated these vulnerabilities.

 

2. Coordination Failures

 

Siloed Communications: The USSS did not effectively communicate with local law enforcement. There were separate communications centers—one for USSS and another for local law enforcement—and they operated on different radio channels, further fragmenting real-time information sharing.

 

Failure to Relay Critical Information: USSS personnel were informed 27 minutes before the shooting that a suspicious individual with a rangefinder was near the AGR building, yet this was not relayed to key officials or acted upon. Similarly, information about an armed person on the AGR roof was received two minutes before the shooting but failed to prompt immediate protective measures for Trump.

 

Disorganization in Planning Meetings: USSS advance agents did not request state or local operational plans and often did not attend site visits or briefings in person. This contributed to the lack of coherent coordination between federal, state, and local agencies.

 

Key Analysis: These coordination failures were critical. Had there been more real-time communication and proper collaboration between USSS and local law enforcement, the suspicious activity around the AGR building might have been addressed in time to prevent the attack.

 

3. Communication and Technical Failures

 

Radio and Equipment Issues: Several USSS agents experienced technical difficulties with their radios during the event, which hindered their ability to communicate with other teams. These problems are noted to be common in USSS operations. In one instance, a key agent did not have a functioning radio throughout the rally.

 

C-UAS (Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System) Failure: The USSS counter-drone system was inoperable for several hours and was only fixed shortly before Crooks flew a drone near the rally site. The agent in charge had little experience with the system and had to call tech support to resolve the issue.

 

Key Analysis: Technical failures, especially the counter-drone system, compromised the event’s security. In today’s environment, where drones can pose significant threats, an inoperable C-UAS system left the site more vulnerable.

 

4. Resource Denial & Insufficient Security Measures

 

Denied Resource Requests: USSS requests for additional security assets, such as a Counter Assault Team liaison and more advanced C-UAS capabilities, were denied without clear explanations. This left the team under-resourced and unable to respond to potential threats, including aerial drones adequately.

 

Insufficient Counter Snipers: Though USSS deployed a counter-sniper team, their positioning and line-of-sight coverage were insufficient. For instance, the trees partially obstructed one sniper team's view of the AGR building roof, from where Crooks ultimately fired. These snipers were not given clear instructions about this obstruction.

Key Analysis: The denial of critical resources (e.g., additional C-UAS assets) and a lack of robust measures, such as properly positioned counter-snipers, further weakened the protective security setup. These deficiencies left Trump exposed at the rally.

 

5. Failures in Response to Known Threats

 

Ignoring “Credible Intelligence”: USSS assigned a counter-sniper team to the rally based on credible intelligence of a threat, which was unusual for a former president’s event. However, the FBI later stated that Crooks was not known to them before the assassination attempt, indicating potential lapses in intelligence coordination.

 

Missed Signals: The USSS failed to act decisively even after receiving reports of suspicious behaviour and an individual on the AGR roof. A counter-sniper observed local officers running towards the AGR building with guns drawn but did not notify Trump’s detail to remove him from the stage, a decision he later admitted was an oversight.

 

Key Analysis: Despite being aware of potential threats, the USSS failed to prepare for or respond to these risks adequately. The intelligence-sharing failures between federal agencies, including the FBI, and the missed opportunities to protect Trump are particularly concerning.

 

Conclusion: Critical Protective Event Failures

The USSS failed at multiple levels, from planning and coordination to communication and response. The failure to define clear responsibilities, the lack of effective communication between agencies, and resource denials critically undermined the event's security. The AGR building, a known vulnerability, was left unprotected, which allowed Crooks to carry out his attack. This report exposes significant weaknesses in the USSS's ability to protect high-profile individuals in complex environments, necessitating major reforms in planning, coordination, and resourcing for future events.